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Title page

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

PROPRIETY OF ESTABLISHING

A

COLONY

IN ONE OF

THE SANDWICH ISLANDS

BEING THE

SUBSTANCE OF A MEMOIRE

SUBMITTED

to the consideration of the right honourable the
secretary of state for war and colonies,
and the lords commissioners of
the admiralty.



By ALEXANDER McKONOCHIE, Esq.
COMMANDER, ROYAL NAVY.

EDINBURGH:
Printed by Walker and Greig.

1816.

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PREFATORY NOTICE.


      The Memoir, of which the following pages profess to contain the substance, I was induced to submit to the high authorities I have indicated, by the consideration, that the details respecting the commerce and navigation of the South Sea, on which a portion of its representations is founded, while they might be new even to some professional men, were likely to be utterly unknown to all others. In now giving it this form, it is very far indeed from my intention, either to anticipate or appeal from the decision which may be passed on its merits where it is thus lodged. On the contrary, whatever it may be, I shall bow to it with submission and respect; but as, amidst the numerous demands on the time and attention of Ministry, the unsupported manuscript memoir of an obscure individual may well be overlooked, I am anxious to lay my plans and wishes before my friends, whose countenance and support may bestow on them a consequence I cannot myself confer, and whose influence, should they approve of them, may assist the solicitations for

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employment in their execution, with which I have presumed to accompany my address to his Royal Highness's Ministers.

      With this view, and with this only, I have thrown off a very few copies of these ConsiDERATions for my own use; nor do I fear the additional publicity they may thus obtain, for they lead to no proposal, the execution of which will demand secrecy on the part of Government, none against which any foreign Power could pretend to remonstrate, however great may be the advantages to this country which its adoption would seem likely to confer. On the contrary, its success, should it ever be undertaken, must depend much on its reception in the mercantile world, and the speculation to which its publicity may give birth.

      In delivering these pages to the friends and brother officers to whom I shall communicate them, I must equally solicit their indulgence for their execution, and their candid interpretation of the motives which have led me to the attempt.

Alex, McKonochie.     

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CONSIDERATIONS,
&c.


That the views of the Government of the United States are fixed on the rebellion of the Spanish Colonies in their neighbourhood, will not appear doubtful, when we consider many particulars in their conduct, the supplies which they covertly afford them, and, still more, the avidity with which, even in their present distressed circumstances of finance, they would seem to court a rupture with old Spain. The vain and empty acknowledgment of their sovereignty over West Florida, would not alone seduce them to this deviation from the pacific line of policy best suited to their situation, were it not reinforced by the prospect of other, and more considerable advantages, connected with the right of openly assisting the insurgent colonists, and of profiting by their success.

      These advantages are indeed not illusory, nor the prospect of their acquisition vague and uncertain, should the present contest end either in the emancipation of these colonies, or in a

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compromise in favour of their trade. The communication with the South Sea, which is now maintained by a painful and laborious passage round Cape Horn, would be abridged, by the acquisition of a free passage for commerce over a the isthmus of Panama, in a degree which would seem to warrant even the most sanguine anticipations. The distance to China would receive a proportional diminution, at the same time that the equivalents, furs and specie, which are offered in the Chinese markets for their commodities, would be presented under advantages which would very peculiarly contrast with the circuitous and expensive route by which our East India Company convey thither the same articles. The supply of Europe with East India produce must be speedily engrossed by a commerce thus supported; nor should we have any reasonable prospect of success in competition with it, unless either by a precarious share in its advantages, dependant on a thousand casualties of favour, interest, or ambition, or by an appeal to that last resort, the force of arms, to which, without an established port upon the spot, we should apply under very serious disadvantages, and with very alarming responsibility. Success might, for a time, and at very considerable expense, sustain our own more circuitous line of commerce; but the maritime resources of the western shores of America are considerable, and would be peculiarly pointed against us by the habits, the animosity, and the policy of the

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United States; nor would the consequences of failure probably rest in the Pacific Ocean.

      While such is the alluring prospect on which the views of the Government of the United States would seem fixed, we, on the other hand, are precluded, by the peculiarity of our circumstances, from interfering in opposition to them on the spot to which they are most immediately directed. In the contest between Spain and her colonies, we can neither league our fortunes with the feeble exertions of the mother country, nor, consistently with our alliance with her, and still more with the benefits we have so recently conferred on her, can we imitate the perfidious policy of France towards ourselves in 1778, which, in the importation of republican principles into her own bosom, was visited by SO severe a measure of chastisement on her head. But though thus precluded from opposing them in their immediate direction, it is both most imperiously our interest, and most unquestionably our right, to prepare to cope with them in their ulterior operation.

      It is the object of the following considerations to shew, that such preparation will materially consist in establishing a Colony in the Sandwich Islands; while, at the same time, such a settlement, even if not required in that point of view, would seem to hold out to us the prospect of commercial advantages of the most important and alluring nature. The interests of this country would therefore seem

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equally connected with it, whatever may be the result of the present contest in New Spain; while, upon the question of our right to take such a step, in addition to our claim on the Sandwich Islands arising from priority of discovery, the usual foundation of such claims, we superadd the voluntary and solemn cession of the sovereignty of Owhyhee to this country, which Captain Vancouver received in 1794 from Tamaah-maah, its supreme Chief ; a transaction precisely similar to that on which Spain so long founded her claims on Nootka, to the prejudice of the more ordinary plea.

      The arguments by which I would endeavour to recommend the settlement I have thus the honour to propose, naturally divide themselves into a consideration of the Military and Commercial Advantages which would seem connected with it.


      I. Military Advantages. — 1. The first military advantage is best illustrated by a reference to what has been already advanced; a recapitulation of the circumstances attending the commerce and navigation between New Spain and the East Indies; and a consideration of the geographical position of the Sandwich Islands, in relation to them. The intercourse between New Spain and the East Indies is confined, in its passage to the westward, to the strength of the trade — winds, in about 12° and 14° north latitude, and to the eastward, to that

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of the westerly winds which prevail in from 35° to 40° or more, also north latitude. It is to be further remarked, that the passage from China to the eastward is more peculiarly confined to the high north latitudes thus denoted; because, although westerly winds equally prevail in the high south latitudes, yet the calms under the Line, currents and prevalence of northerly winds at all seasons, under the high land of New Spain, render it not merely inexpedient, but even utterly impracticable to establish a habitual communication in this direction. The Sandwich Islands, lying in about 20° north latitude, and 1559 west longitude, placed about one — third over from America towards China, and between these two tracks thus appropriated to the intercourse between them by the laws of nature, — — the Sandwich Islands, in this situation, equally command both passages, form the key to the whole communication, and stand to these several coasts in nearly the same relation which the British Isles themselves bear to the north of Europe; the Cape of Good Hope and Ceylon to India ; Malta and Gibraltar to the shores of the Mediterranean and the Bermudas to those of the Atlantic.

      The occupation of such a post must indeed be interesting to Great Britain, whose whole monopoly of the supply of Europe with East India produce, must be at the mercy of the masters of the Isthmus of New Spain, unless she be possessed of the means of arresting, mo-

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difying, or engrossing also their supply. Were their intercourse with China and the East India Islands extended, by their own means, or by those of a rival power, so that Porto Bello or Vera Cruz became entrepots of their productions, the convenience of the voyage, and the cheapness of the merchandize, would attract thither all the speculation of Europe ; and the blockading these ports, the only resource left to us if excluded from the Pacific, would only again make our belligerent rights the subject of angry and invidious discussion among the neutral powers. The intercepting this commerce in the Pacific, would not be productive of the same effect; the precarious nature of the supply would keep up the prices in the Isthmus; and while, in time of peace, our own merchants and colonies would equally profit by the shorter passage, in time of war its advantages would be equally forfeited by our commercial rivals.

      2. The security of our East India possessions would seem to require an outpost to the Eastward. The exaggerated importance attached by public opinion to the French expedition to Egypt, and the consequent depression of East India stock, are both within our immediate recollection ; but our alarms have never, in an equal degree, been excited to the Eastward, from the supineness of the adversary whom we have there had to encounter. Yet had the Isthmus of Panama belonged to either the French or

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Dutch ; had the First Consul transported thither the army he sacrificed at St Domingo, and thereby acquired the command of the immense maritime resources of its western shores, the . weakness of our barrier in this direction would have long since excited our jealousy and alarm. We can now neither calculate on the restoration of this Isthmus to its former possessors, nor on their continued supineness ; it is time therefore to look to our own strength only for security.

      3. As I shall presently endeavour to shew, such a settlement would immediately give fresh life and vigour to our now languishing commerce in the Pacific Ocean. A new and extensive nursery would be thereby formed for our seamen ; an object of peculiar import, at a moment when the reduction of our fleet has dismissed many from our public service, and much discouragement, and even distress, have in consequence ensued among them.

      4. Besides a nursery for British seamen, a very important supply of natives would be procured for our service. The Sandwich islanders shew a marked — propensity to nautical pursuits, and instead of reaping only disease and desolation from their intercourse with Europeans, have made a leap towards power and consequence in these seas altogether incredible. In 1794, Captain Vancouver laid down for Tamaah-maah, their chief, the keel, thirty — six feet long, of his first vessel : In 1803, Mr Turnbull

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found the same prince in possession of twenty vessels, of from 25 to 70 tons burthen; and in 1810 Campbell describes him surrounded with native artizans of almost every description, and numbering a navy of fifty sail, of which one was a ship of 200 tons burthen. The acquisition of the resources, moral and physical, by which such a miracle had been accomplished, is indeed an object of secondary, but yet considerable importance.

      Lastly, The possession of a settlement in the Pacific Ocean becomes daily more interesting, both in a military and commercial point of view, from the progress of the Russian settlements on the south — east coast of Tartary, and north — west of America. Dependant as we are in a great measure on Russia for our naval supplies, it becomes most interesting to us to know by what arms she may be assailed to advantage, or by what means the effects of her hostility may be eluded, should the friendship and confidence now subsisting between the two powers ever suffer diminution. In this latter point of view, the more particular survey and application of the maritime resources of New Albion, of which Captain Vancouver speaks in very high terms, become objects of considerable relative importance; and it is worthy, too, of record, that the Russians have already directed their attention to the Sandwich Islands. In 1809, when Campbell was at Alexandria, in the island of Kodiak, encouragements were

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held out to adventurers willing to form a settlement in them; and though the plan proved then abortive, probably from deficiency of population to sustain an emigration, it yet holds out too many allurements to be altogether laid aside. A timely interposition now, in favour of our unquestionable rights, may save some future angry discussion ; and as the Russians only look to the Sandwich islands for supplies of provisions, the acquisition of that branch of commerce might prove a 'new bond of union between the two empires.


      II. Commercial advantages. To explain the full extent of these, it will be necessary to consider the prevailing obstacles which have hitherto paralyzed our commercial exertions in the Pacific Ocean. These arise principally from the isolated object, and limited range of resource, with which, on account of the extreme distance, and utter want of a colonial port, merchants have been obliged to prosecute their speculations. The fur trader is unable to combine any secondary object with his principal pursuit ; his time on the coast is equally limited by the season, and by his inability any where to recruit his supplies. He is dependant on Canton for a market, on the East India Company for a homeward bound cargo, and should he lose any men by sickness or desertion, he is utterly unable to replace them. The whaler, in like manner, makes the tour of

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the globe to catch nine or ten fish, happy if the result of his voyage, administered in all its details with the most scrupulous economy, reward his enterprize by even a moderate profit. So uncertain is he of this result, that he pays his seamen, not by fixed wages, but by shares in the nett proceeds, a method not less dictated by the uncertainty of his returns, than by his desire to ensure their continuance in his service, and to interest them in the success of their perilous employment. He is nearly equally limited with the fur trader in his range of speculation, and equally destitute of the means of supply in cases of accident or distress.

      Under such circumstances, it is not extraordinary that the British share of the commerce of the Pacific Ocean should be small; that the fishing of the spermaceti whale should be alone pursued, that of the black whale being utterly unable to defray its expenses; and that of the fur traders who enter the port of Canton, four-fifths should be Americans, who are encouraged to this perseverance, partly by greater economy in the details of their voyages, partly by their higher appreciation of minute profits, but more than all, by their habitual application of the resources afforded by the Sandwich islands. In 1793, Captain Vancouver found three American seamen left by their employer at Woahoo, on permanent wages of eight dollars a month, to collect for him a cargo of sandal wood, and

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the necessary refreshments on his return. In 1803, Mr Turnbull found several of them established about the person of Tamaah-maah, and holding situations of trust under his government; and in 1810, Campbell counted at one time sixty white persons at Woahoo, now become the residence of that prince. It is true, they still respected the British flag displayed by him ever since his acknowledgment of the supreme sovereignty of Great Britain ; and equally true, that the greater number of these men were English deserters, and refugee convicts from New South Wales. But it cannot be doubted, that among a rude 'people personal affection, cemented by the interchange of commercial benefits, will far outweigh any abstract attachment to a flag; and we are not now to learn, that renegade Englishmen, of whatever description, become in principle and views, Americans of the worst and most hostile description. The proof and extent of the danger are contained in the comparative statement of the intercourse maintained. In 1810, of twelve ships which touched at these islands, two were English, one Russian, and nine Americans.

      The following are some of the principal commercial advantages which would seem attached to the establishment of a British settlement at the same place. They are calculated principally or, the supposition of the Isthmus of Panama remaining shut to commercial enterprize; the supposition on which the acquisition of

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some of the military advantages above detailed would seem least conspicuously desirable.

      1. The whale fishing would be prosecuted in vessels belonging to this new colony. The fishermen would also belong to it; and these bold adventurous seamen would be constantly employed in those functions, of which their skill and intrepidity secure to them the monopoly, instead of passing, as they do now, the greater part of their time in a laborious passage to and from the scene of employment. They would boil their oil, and purify their spermaceti on the spot, and reduce them to their most portable state before embarking them in the vessels destined to convey them to Europe.

      2. Vessels destined for cargoes of oil and spermaceti would proceed to a known port for their lading. They would carry out with them the goods destined for the prosecution of the fur and other traffics, which would be either the venture of their owners, or consignments for the colony. In either case, the profits on their sale or freight would form an important item in the credit — account of the voyage, would reduce the scale of its relative expenses, and would enable the black whale fishery to become again a lucrative object of mercantile speculation.

      3. The expense of carrying these goods to the place of barter would be proportionally, diminished, when their transport became no. longer the sole object of the voyage. Higher

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priced goods might consequently be sent, and a demand created for the more expensive and profitable productions of the British manufacturer's industry. At present, the whole gross profits of the trade, exceeding in many cases 2000 per cent, are absorbed in the merchants bill of expenses; he is unable to export more than the coarsest articles, which sustain a severe and even successful competition from the imperfect Russian and American manufactures. ; 4. The fur trade, conducted under the immediate inspection of those most interested in its success, would discover new channels of communication, both with the places where furs are procured, and where they are disposed of. The establishment of furriers and manufacturers on the spot would enhance the value


      * One of these is too important to pass unnoticed. By the treaty of Nerschinsk, by which the trade between Russia and China was regulated, two depots were named, Kiachta and Zuruchaitu, where alone the respective merchants were to meet. The Russian exports consist of furs and manufactures; of the furs many are brought from the Fox, Aleutian, and other islands and settlements in the Pacific, which, being landed at Ochotsk, are thence transported to Kiachta, the nearest depot, by a land carriage exceeding 2000 miles. The manufactures are partly British, partly French, Russian, and Prussian, and in like manner arrive at Kiachta, where they are still distant 51 days journey from Pekin, by a land carriage from Petersburgh of 6,508 versts, exceeding 4000 miles. No consumption of them ensues by the way; saddled with the expense of such a

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of furs in the Chinese markets, and probably increase their demand.

      5. A considerable portion of the price paid by the East India Company at Canton for their investments, is in specie. This specie is presented in the Chinese market under every possible disadvantage. It is purchased in the English bullion market, subjected to the multiplied expenses of two or three times landing and re — shipping, and it is then transported to Canton by a voyage exceeding 20,000 miles in distance, and demanding from 4 to 6 months in its prosecution. Under such circumstances, it is not to be doubted, that it costs the Company at least double its nominal value at Canton. A portion of this disadvantageous exportation would be obviated by this new colony. The colonists would obtain a very large credit in China from their importations of furs, naval stores,


journey, their acquisition is equally beyond the means of Tartar horde, or Siberian exile.

      The commercial advantages which would accrue to us by being enabled to present the same manufactures at Ochotsk on reasonable terms, hardly require illustration. A considerable consumption of them would take place on the spot; the competition of the foreign manufactures, which would have a land journey of double the distance, would be superseded, and we should reap the profits on the subsequent sale of the furs we should receive in exchange. The active parigation of the gulph of Corea might lead to further commercial intercourse with Japan of the most important nature; in short, it is impossible to set limits to the prospect which such a change might open.

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&c. beyond what they would require to vest in commodities, and would very gladly complete the circle of their communications with the mother country, by accepting the Company's bills on terms mutually advantageous. The progressive growth of this resource, interesting even in its infancy, would become peculiarly so, when the increased intercourse with the Spanish colonies in America should open that rich and inexhaustible market for East India manufactures and productions, with which accordingly, instead of bills, the Company would soon purchase this accommodation. Without an intermediate establishment, our East India possessions, situate so far to the westward, would have no chance of obtaining this vent for their productions, the supply of the Spanish colonies would either again revert to the Philippine, or pass to the Dutch islands : by means of it, our activity, capital, and superior maritime resources, would secure to us its almost exclusive possession.

      6. The necessity under which all vessels bound to the Pacific now labour, of equipping in England for two or three years, is one of the greatest hardships imposed on them, and would be, by means of this settlement, obviated. In voyages of such duration, more stores are expended by rot than by service, and of those which remain to be brought into use, half the efficiency is perhaps cancelled, by the want of some corresponding article of equipment. The

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obviating this embarrassment is not less a' military than a commercial object; and in the event of a future war with either of the Americas, with Spain, with Russia, with China, in a word, with any conflicting interest in that hemisphere, may prove of an importance it may be impossible too highly to appreciate, and proportional only to the stake for which we may be called on to contend.

      It would be very easy to extend this enumeration to an indefinite length; to include in it the extension of hydrographical science, the communication of the instruments of luxury and convenience to the rude nations of the Pacific, the consequent increased demand for our manufactures, with many other objects of equal importance to this country. But if I am correct in what I have already advanced, my argument would acquire no additional strength from such — a trespass on the attention with which I hope to be honoured. I will only solicit permission to make one more remark. These commercial advantages are only calculated on the improvement of already well — known objects of mercantile speculation; but it is beyond a doubt, that the establishment of a vigorous and enterprising.colony on the spot would soon create or — elicit many more. The demand which the liberal supply of the Spanish colonies would 'occasion on our East India possessions for their manufactures and productions, which the existence of this colony would create on New South

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Wales for its surplus agricultural produce, on New Albion for naval stores, on South America for the precious metals; the facilities it would afford for a contraband trade with these coasts, while they continue subject to the exclusive restrictions of the mother country; for its free prosecution on their repeal ; — these form a very imperfect enumeration of the various sources of lucrative traffic, which an attentive examination of the statistics of these .regions would suggest, and to the pursuit of which such a settlement would give immediate vigour and activity. Nor can its distance be a reasonable ground of objection. Should a passage ever be granted to commercial enterprise over the Isthmus of New Spain, the facilities of communication would be infinitely superior to what we enjoy with any of our East India possessions; and even should that remain for ever shut, the passage round Cape Horn, divested as it now is of its imaginary terrors, if provided with a good colonial port at its conclusion, would become the mere object of everyday undertaking.

      To conclude, I believe I may not with propriety enlarge on the many circumstances in the present state of politics in the world, not merely favourable to the execution of such a measure as this of which I have thus considered the advantages, but also incentive to its undertaking. I may be allowed, however, to make the three following remarks: First, Spain,

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uncertain of ever recovering h?r colonies, can now neither feel nor testify the same jealousy of such a settlement as she expressed on occasion of those at Nootka and the Falkland Islands. Secondly, The dispersion and animosity of the French exiles, render the importation of politics hostile to the interests of Great Britain into New Spain now more than ever probable, particularly when connected with their favourable reception in the United States. And, lastly, The chain is at present broken between New Spain and the Philippine Islands, while, by our recent treaties, those islands in the Chinese Seas are restored to our old and active commercial rivals, the Dutch, which, from proximity of geographical position, will more naturally fill up the chasm than our East India possessions, unless supported and assisted by some strong measure on the part of Government. That measure can only be the interposition of an intermediate settlement.


      In the Memoir to Government, of which I have thus detailed the substance, it would not have become me to propose limits to the scale on which such a plan should be undertaken ; and I indeed professed my inability to speak with precision on the point. I presumed, however, to state, that I believed I could undertake to answer some of the civil, and most of the military demands, of the peaceful infancy of such a settlement, from the resources of one of

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our large troop — ships, aided either by one or two small men of war, or furnished with such additional number of officers and men as might enable me to equip two or three tenders for the conveyance of orders and maintenance of authority among the islands. I begged permission to represent, that very few of the difficulties would intervene here, which made the infancy of the settlement at Port — Jackson so burdensome and expensive. This would be a commercial, not an agricultural colony. The inhabitants are already friendly, provisions already abundant, nor would the increase of the permanent population be so rapid as to preclude the necessary preparations. I beg leave here to repeat the sanguine belief which I there state, that from the first hour of our settlement we should depend on the mother country only for her manufactures and her protection.

    These opinions and speculations may be erroneous, and I now submit them with the diffidence of one unaccustomed to hazard the communication of his sentiments on public service. I hazard them, however, actuated by a most sincere interest in the greatness and welfare of my native country; by an intimate conviction of the importance of the revolution now under contest in New Spain, and by a belief, that however that may now terminate, Spain can only long retain her influence in that country, by the improvement and encouragement of its many natural and commercial advantages, not

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by their oppression. With these concurrent motives, I will not deny, that there is also mixed up a very ardent desire of recommending my own personal services to those who alike dispense the toiis and the rewards of individual ambition ; a very anxious wish to be employed in the execution of this, or of any other plan which His Majesty's Ministers in their wisdom may adopt, for the maintenance and promotion of British interests in these seas.

ALEX. McKONOCHIE.     



———————————————

      Printed by Walker and Greig,
                    Edinburgh.

      NOTE. — When I drew up the Memoir, of which I have thus detailed the substance, it had not occurred to me to remark the bearing of the subject on the trade of our Hudson's Bay and North — West Fur Companies. The consideration of this topic acquires, however, very peculiar additional interest from its further connexion with the security of Canada, respecting which our jealousy and alarm have been more than once painfully excited.

      It is well known, that our Fur Companies do not procure the furs which they import, by hunting down themselves the animals of which they are the spoils, but by purchase from the wandering tribes of native Indians. The furs, thus procured, are brought to England, whence, besides supplying the European consumption, a very large proportion is sent to China, partly by sea to Canton, partly disposed of at St Petersburgh, and transported by land to Kiachta and Zuruchaitu.

      Now, it is very evident, that the establishment of an active commercial rival in the Pacific Ocean would equally strike at the root and branch of this traffic, at the source whence the furs are drawn, and the market whither they are conveyed. A nation with the command of the productions both of Asia and America, would soon be enabled to lure the native Indians to its depots of traffic, by prices which could not possibly be paid by our Companies. In like manner, there could be no competition in a subsequent sale, where the distance of one party from the market was scarcely one — third that of the other. Should our Companies, as would be natural and probable, endeavour to enter the lists on somewhat more equal terms by extending their communications to the Pacific, were they there only to meet inimical, or at least rival establishments, even in the best times they would trade under peculiar disadvantages; while, on every occasion of hostility, their property would be subject to plunder and confiscation. There is undoubtedly a strong feeling in the Canadas, both of affection for the mother country, and animosity towards their immediate neighbours ; but it would be to tax those feelings very high indeed, to place them permanently in opposition to the dictates of private interest, thus forcibly inculcated.

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      It is unnecessary to illustrate at length the very different prospect which our preoccupation of the South Seas by a vigorous colony would present. The Fur Companies would divide their furs into two portions. With the one they would come to England as usual, supply the demands of Europe, and whatever Russia might still continue to carry to China in competition with their other branch. With the other portion they would proceed to the north — west shores, (the communication is not difficult down either the Tacoutche Tesse (Columbia) or Salmon River,) where they would receive from this colony that protection, and those facilities, which would extend their intercourse with China, and probably open a new market in South America. They would receive, in exchange, bills on London, drawn by the colonial merchants, or East India Company, together with such portion of Asiatic and South American productions, as should not only supply the wants of the Canadas themselves, but also open a source of lucrative traffic with the back settlements of the United States, for which the course of the Mississippi offers peculiar facilities. The activity thus given to capital in Canada, would elicit the improvement of its various sources of Wealth and opulence; and the precarious nature of this stream of commerce, which, as it would be fostered by the protection, would be forfeited by the hostility of the mother country, would fortify that feeling of loyalty, founded on identity of interest, without which, it were superfluous to observe, all colonial possessions are precarious, and which, though it may not be altogether wanting in Canada, is yet at present supported by no very adequate or very obvious considerations.

Notes.

Alexander Maconochie (11 February 1787 – 25 October 1860) was a Scottish naval officer, geographer, and penal reformer.

In 1840, Maconochie became the Governor of Norfolk Island, a prison island where convicts were treated with severe brutality and were seen as lost causes. Upon reaching the island, Maconochie immediately instituted policies that restored dignity to prisoners, achieving remarkable success in prisoner rehabilitation. These policies were well in advance of their time and Maconochie was politically undermined. His ideas would be largely ignored and forgotten, only to be readopted as the basis of modern penal systems over a century later in the mid- to late 20th century.

Wikipedia.     

Source.
Alexander Maconochie.
      Considerations on the Propriety of Establishing a Colony in one of the Sandwich Islands. Being the substance of a memoir submitted to the consideration of the right honourable the Secretary of State for War and Colonies, and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.
Edinburgh: Walker and Greig, 1816.

This transcription used the PDF volume at Google Books.


Last updated by Tom Tyler, Denver, CO, USA, Apr 01, 2023

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